Rover Field Network Systems

Inline intrusion prevention · server form factor

Rover Intercept

An inline intrusion prevention system in a server chassis, with threat intelligence built into the product rather than bolted onto it. Intercept sits in the traffic path and stops what it recognises, and the intelligence deciding what it recognises is yours to extend.

Inline prevention Customisable CTI Server form factor On premise

Inline means inline

Detection tells you afterwards. Prevention decides at the time.

A detection system watches a copy of the traffic and raises an alert. By the time anyone reads it, the session it describes has completed. Intercept is in the path: traffic passes through it, and what matches is dropped rather than recorded and forwarded.

That placement is the whole value and also the whole risk, so the answer is in the hardware. Intercept inspects through a bypass NIC that holds the link up on its own if the software stops, the appliance loses power, or the unit comes out for maintenance. The inspection path can fail without the link failing with it.

What the link then does is a setting rather than a property of the product, chosen per site. A site that cannot afford to lose the link and a site that must not pass uninspected traffic are different problems, and the same appliance answers both.

The intelligence is the product

Threat intelligence you can add to

Integrated

Included
Threat intelligence ships with the product rather than as a separate subscription to negotiate
Updates
Indicators reach the enforcement point as policy, without a change ticket per feed refresh
Coverage
The commercial and open intelligence most estates are already paying for, consolidated

Customisable

Your indicators
Load your own, including intelligence you are not able to hand to a vendor
Tuning
Suppress, promote, or scope a source rather than accepting a feed whole
Programme-specific
Indicators that apply to one contract, one enclave, or one period, without polluting the rest of the estate
Stays put
Custom intelligence remains on the device, inside your boundary
This is the part worth pressing any vendor on. Most inline products will happily consume a commercial feed. Far fewer will let you enforce on intelligence you cannot share with them, which is precisely the intelligence that matters in a cleared programme. If the indicators have to leave your boundary to become a rule, they are not really yours.

Form factor

Platform

Chassis
Standard rack server rather than a proprietary appliance
Scaling
Throughput follows the server specification, so capacity is a sizing exercise rather than a product tier
Silicon
No vendor-locked inspection hardware to design a refresh cycle around
Placement
Data centre or site comms room, in the path of the links you choose to inspect

Deployment

Bypass
Hardware bypass NIC, independent of the inspection software and of appliance power
Fail mode
Fail-open or fail-closed, set per site rather than fixed in the product
Scope
Chosen links rather than everything, so inspection lands where it earns its latency
Telemetry
Events feed your monitoring, including collection running on Datum
Sizing
Specified against link throughput, inspection depth, and retention

Three products, three layers

Intercept, Datum and Obscura stop different things

All three block. They do it at different layers, and a serious estate usually wants more than one. Which you need depends on what you are trying to stop.

Name layer

Datum

Stops a device reaching a known-bad destination by refusing to resolve the name. Cheap, estate-wide, and works on endpoints you cannot install anything on. It does not see inside the traffic.

Packet layer

Intercept

Inspects the traffic itself and drops what matches. Catches what never asked DNS a question, including direct-to-address activity and exploitation of a service you meant to expose.

Application layer

Obscura

Looks at what applications send and return, and stops controlled information leaving or a call an application should not honour. Concerned with your data going out, not an attack coming in.

Datum answers "should this device be talking to that". Intercept answers "is this traffic an attack". Obscura answers "should this data be leaving". Different questions, and no one of them covers the other two.